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Abstract. When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson’s
optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey’s second-price
auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs
between the two criteria, that is, auctions that optimize, say, revenue under the
constraint that the welfare is above a given level. If one allows for randomized
mechanisms, it is easy to see that there are polynomial-time mechanisms that
achieve any point in the trade-off (the Pareto curve) between revenue and welfare.
We investigate whether one can achieve the same guarantees using deterministic
mechanisms. We provide a negative answer to this question by showing that this
is a (weakly) NP-hard problem. On the positive side, we provide polynomial-time
deterministic mechanisms that approximate with arbitrary precision any point of
the trade-off between these two fundamental objectives for the case of two bid-
ders, even when the valuations are correlated arbitrarily. The major problem left
open by our work is whether there is such an algorithm for three or more bidders
with independent valuation distributions.
1 Introduction
Two are the fundamental results in the theory of auctions. First, Vickrey observed that
there is a simple way to run an auction so that social welfare (efficiency) is maximized:
The second-price (Vickrey) auction is optimally efficient, independently of how bidder
valuations are distributed. However, the whole point of the Vickrey auction is to delib-
erately sacrifice auctioneer revenue in order to achieve efficiency. If auctioneer revenue
is to be maximized, Myerson showed in 1980 that, when the bidders’ valuations are
distributed independently, a straightforward auction (essentially, a clever reduction to
Vickrey’s auction via an ingenious transformation of valuations) achieves this.
These two criteria, social welfare and revenue, are arguably of singular and paramount
importance. It is therefore a pity that they seem to be at loggerheads: It is not hard to
establish that optimizing any one of these two criteria can be very suboptimal with re-
spect to the other. In other words, there is a substantial trade-off between these two
important and natural objectives. What are the various intermediate (Pareto) points of
this trade-off? And can each such point be computed — or all such points summarized
somehow — in polynomial time? This is the fundamental problem that we consider in
this paper. See Figure 1 (a) for a graphical illustration.
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Fig. 1: The Pareto points of the bi-criterion auction problem are shown as squares (a); the Pareto
points may be far off the line connecting the two extremes (b), and may be non-convex (c). The
Pareto points of randomized auctions comprise the upper boundary of the convex closure of the
Pareto points (d). Even though the Pareto set may be exponential in size, for any  > 0, there is
always a polynomially small set of -Pareto points, the triangular points in (e), that is, points that
are not dominated by other solutions by more than  in any dimension. We study the problem of
computing such a set in polynomial time.
The problem of exploring the revenue/welfare trade-off in auctions turns out to be
a rather sophisticated problem, defying several naive approaches. One common-sense
approach is to simply randomize between the optima of the two extremes, Vickrey’s
and Myerson’s auctions. This can produce very poor results, since it only explores the
straight line joining the two extreme points, which can be very far from the true trade-
off (Figure 1 (b)). A second common-sense approach is the so-called slope search: To
explore the trade-off space, just optimize the objective “revenue + λ· welfare” for var-
ious values of λ > 0. By modifying Myerson’s auction this objective can indeed be
optimized efficiently, as it was pointed out seven years ago by Likhodedov and Sand-
holm [19]. The problem is that the trade-off curve may not be convex (Figure 1 (c)),
and hence the algorithm of [19] can miss vast areas of trade-offs:
Proposition 1. There exist instances with two bidders with monotone hazard rate dis-
tributions for which the Pareto curve is not convex; in contrast the Pareto curve is
always convex for one bidder with a monotone hazard rate distribution.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A. It follows that the slope search approach of
[19] is incorrect. However, the correctness of the slope search approach is restored if
one is willing to settle for randomized mechanisms: The trade-off space of randomized
mechanisms is always convex (in particular, it is the convex hull of the deterministic
mechanisms, (Figure 1 (d)). It is easy to see (and it had been actually worked out for
different purposes already in [23]) that the optimum randomized mechanism with re-
spect to the metric “revenue + λ· welfare” is easy to calculate.
Proposition 2. The optimum randomized mechanism for the objective “revenue + λ·
welfare” can be computed in polynomial time. Hence, any point of the revenue/welfare
trade-off for randomized mechanisms can be computed in polynomial time.
1.1 Our results
In this paper we consider the problem of exploring the revenue/welfare trade-off for de-
terministic mechanisms, and show that it is an intractable problem in general, even for
two bidders (Theorem 2). Comparing with Proposition 2, this result adds to the recent
surge in literature pointing out complexity gaps between randomized and determinis-
tic mechanisms [26, 12, 13, 11]. Randomized mechanisms are of course a powerful
and useful analytical concept, but it is deterministic mechanisms and auctions that we
are chiefly interested in. Hence such complexity gaps are meaningful and onerous. We
also show that there are instances for which the set of Pareto optimal mechanisms has
exponential size.
On the positive side, we show that the problem can be solved for two bidders, even
for correlated valuations (Theorem 4). By “solved” we mean that any trade-off point
can be approximated with arbitrarily high precision in polynomial time in both the in-
put and the precision — that is to say, by an FPTAS. It also means (by results in [28])
that an approximate summary of the trade-off (the -Pareto curve), of polynomial size
(Figure 1(e)), can be computed in polynomial time. The derivation of the two-bidders
algorithm (see Section 4.1) is quite involved. We first find a pseudo-polynomial dy-
namic programming algorithm for the problem of finding a mechanism with welfare
(resp. revenue) exactly a given number. This algorithm is very different from the one
in [26] for optimal auctions in the two bidder case, but it exploits the same feature of
the problem, namely its planar nature. We then recall Theorem 4 of [28] (Section 2)
which establishes a connection between such pseudo-polynomial algorithms for the
exact problems and FPTAS for the trade-off problem. However, the present problem
violates several key assumptions of that theorem, and a custom reduction to the exact
problem is needed.
Unfortunately for three or more bidders the above approach no longer works; this
is not surprising since, as it was recently shown in [26], just maximizing revenue is
an APX-hard problem in the correlated case. The main problem left open in this work
is whether there is an FPTAS for three or more bidders with independent valuation
distributions.
We also look at another interesting case of the n-bidder problem, in which the val-
uation distributions have support two. This case is of some methodological interest
because, in general, n-dimensional problems of this sort in mechanism design have not
been characterized computationally, because of the difficulty related to the exponential
size of the solution sought; binary-valued bidders have served as a first step towards
the understanding of auction problems in the past, for example in the study of opti-
mal multi-object auctions [3]. We show that the trade-off problem is in PSPACE and
(weakly) NP-hard (Theorem 5).
1.2 Related work
Although [19] appears to be the only previous paper explicitly treating optimal auc-
tion design as a multi-objective optimization problem, there has been substantial work
in studying the relation of the two objectives. The most prominent paper in the area
is that of Bulow and Klemperer [4] who show that the revenue benefits of adding one
extra bidder and running the efficiency-maximizing auction surpasses those of running
the revenue-maximizing auction. In [2] the authors show that for valuations drawn in-
dependently from the same monotone hazard rate distribution, an analogous theorem
holds for efficiency: by adding Θ(log n) extra bidders and running Myerson’s auction,
one gets at least the efficiency of Vickrey’s auction. This paper also shows that for these
distributions both the welfare and the revenue ratios between Vickrey and Myerson’s
auctions are bounded by 1/e: in our terms this implies that the extreme points of the
Pareto curve lie within a constant factor of each other and so constant factor approx-
imations are trivial; we note that no such constant ratios are known for more general
distributions (not even for the case of regular distributions), assuming of course that
the ratio between all bidders’ maximum and minimum valuation is arbitrary. This kind
of revenue and welfare ratios are also studied in [29] for keyword auctions (multi-item
auctions), and in [24] for single-item english auctions and valuations drawn from a dis-
tribution with bounded support. In [1] the authors present some tight bounds for the
efficiency loss of revenue-optimal mechanisms, which depend on the number of bid-
ders and the size of the support. Finally, and very recently, [7] gives simple auctions (in
particular, second-price auctions with appropriately chosen reserve prices) that simul-
taneously guarantee a 20% fraction of both the optimal revenue and the optimal social
welfare, when bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from (possibly different)
regular distributions: in multiobjective optimization parlance, their auctions belong to
the knee of the Pareto curve. In this work (Section 4) we provide an algorithm for ap-
proximating any point of the Pareto curve within arbitrary precision, albeit sacrificing
the simplicity of the auction format.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bayesian Mechanism Design
We are interested in auctioning a single, indivisible item to n bidders. We assume every
bidder i has a private valuation vi for the item and that her valuation is drawn from
some discrete probability distribution over support of size hi with probability density
function fi(·). We use vki and fki , k = 1, . . . , hi, to denote the k-th smallest element in
the support of bidder i and its probability mass respectively.
Formally an auction consists of an allocation rule xi(v1, . . . , vn), the probability
of bidder i getting allocated the item, and a payment rule pi(v1, . . . , vn) which is the
price paid by bidder i. In this paper we focus our attention on deterministic mechanisms
so that xi(·) ∈ {0, 1}. We demand from our auctions to satisfy the two standard con-
straints of ex-post incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR); it is well
known [25] that any such auction has the following special form: if we fix the valua-
tion of all bidders except for bidder i, then there is a threshold value ti(v−i), such that
bidder i only gets the item for values vi ≥ ti(vi) and pays ti(v−i). In particular one
can show that, for the discrete setting and for the objectives of welfare and revenue we
are interested in, we can wlog assume that the threshold values ti of any Pareto optimal
auction will always be on the support of bidder i.
Relying on the above characterization, we will describe our mechanisms using the
concept of an allocation matrix A: a h1 × . . . × hn matrix where entry (i1, . . . , in)
corresponds to the tuple (vi11 , . . . , v
in
n ) of bidder’s valuations. Each entry takes values
from {0, 1, . . . , n} indicating which bidder gets allocated the item for the given tuple of
valuations, with 0 indicating that the auctioneer keeps the item. In order for an allocation
matrix to correspond to a valid (ex-post IC and IR) auction a necessary and sufficient
condition is the following monotonicity constraint: if A[i1, . . . , ij , . . . , in] = j then
A[i1, . . . , k, . . . , in] = j for all k ≥ ij . Notice that the payment of the bidder who
gets allocated the item can be determined as the least value in his support for which
he still gets the item, keeping the values of the other bidders fixed; moreover, when
there is only a constant number of bidders, the allocation matrix provides a polynomial
representation of an auction.
2.2 Multi-Objective Optimization
Trade-offs are present everywhere in life and science — in fact, one can argue that op-
timization theory studies the very special and degenerate case in which we happen to
be interested in only one objective. There is a long research tradition of multi-objective
or multi-criterion optimization, developing methodologies for computing the trade-off
points (called the Pareto set) of optimization problems with many objectives, see for
example [18, 14, 20]. However, there is a computational awkwardness about this prob-
lem: Even for simple cases, such as bicriterion shortest paths, the Pareto set (the set of
all undominated feasible solutions) can be exponential, and thus it can never be poly-
nomially computed. In 2000, Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [28] identified a sense in
which this is a meaningful problem: They showed that there is always a set of solutions
of polynomial size that are approximately undominated, within arbitrary precision; a
multi-objective problem is considered tractable if such a set can be computed in poly-
nomial time. Since then, much progress has been made in the algorithmic theory of
multi-objective optimization [30, 10, 9, 17, 6, 5, 8], and much methodology has been
developed, some of which has been applied to mechanism design before [16]. In this
paper we use this methodology for studying Bayesian auctions under the two criteria of
expected revenue and social welfare.
The BI-CRITERION AUCTION problem. We want to design deterministic auctions
that perform favorably with respect to (expected) social welfare, defined as SW =
E[
∑
i xivi] and (expected) revenue, defined as Rev = E[
∑
i pi]. Based on the afore-
mentioned characterization with allocation matrices, we can view an auction as a feasi-
ble solution to a combinatorial problem. An instance specifies the number n of bidders
and for each bidder its distribution on valuations. The size of the instance is the num-
ber of bits needed to represent these distributions. We map solutions (mechanisms) to
points (x, y) in the plane, where we use the x-axis for the welfare and the y-axis for the
revenue. The objective space is the set of such points.
Let p, q ∈ R2+. We say that p dominates q if p ≥ q (coordinate-wise). We say that p
-covers q ( ≥ 0) if p ≥ q/(1+). LetA ⊆ R2+. The Pareto set ofA, denoted by P (A),
is the subset of undominated points in A (i.e. p ∈ P (A) iff p ∈ A and no other point in
A dominates p). We say that P (A) is convex if it contains no points that are dominated
by convex combinations of other points. Given a set A ⊆ R2+ and  > 0, an -Pareto set
of A, denoted by P(A), is a subset of points in A that -cover all vectors in A. Given
two mechanismsM,M ′ we define domination between them according to the 2-vectors
of their objective values. This naturally defines the Pareto set and approximate Pareto
sets for our auction setting.
As shown in [28], for every instance and  > 0, there exists an -Pareto set of
polynomial size. The issue is one of efficient computability. There is a simple necessary
and sufficient condition, which relates the efficient computability of an -Pareto set
to the following GAP Problem: given an instance I , a (positive rational) 2-vector b =
(W0, R0), and a rational δ > 0, either return a mechanismM whose 2-vector dominates
b, i.e. SW(M) ≥ W0 and Rev(M) ≥ R0, or report that there does not exist any
mechanism that is better than b by at least a (1 + δ) factor in both coordinates, i.e. such
that SW(M) ≥ (1 + δ) · W0 and Rev(M) ≥ (1 + δ) · R0. There is an FPTAS for
constructing an -Pareto set iff there is an FPTAS for the GAP Problem [28].
Remark 1. Even though our exposition focuses on discrete distributions, our results
easily extend to continuous distributions as well. As in [26], given a sufficiently smooth
continuous density (say Lipschitz-continuous), whose support lies in a finite interval
[v, v],3 we can appropriately discretize (while preserving the optimal values within
O()) and run our algorithms on the discrete approximations.
From exact to bi-criterion. We will make essential use of a result from [28] reducing
the multi-objective version of a linear optimization problemA to its exact version: LetA
be a discrete linear optimization problem whose objective function(s) have non-negative
coefficients. The exact version of a A is the following problem: Given an instance x of
A, and a positive rational C, is there a feasible solution with objective function value
exactly C? For such problems, a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the exact version of
implies an FPTAS for the multi-objective version:
Theorem 1 ([28]). LetA be a linear multi-objective problem whose objective functions
have non-negative coefficients: If there exists a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the
exact version of A, then there exists an FPTAS for constructing an approximate Pareto
curve for A.
To obtain our main algorithmic result (Theorem 4), we design a pseudo-polynomial
algorithm for the exact version of the BI-CRITERION AUCTION problem and apply
Theorem 1 to deduce the existence of an FPTAS. However, it is not obvious why BI-
CRITERION AUCTION satisfies the condition of the theorem, since in the standard rep-
resentation of the problem as a linear problem, the objective functions typically have
3 This is the standard approach in economics, see for example [22].
negative coefficients. We show however (Lemma 2) that there exists an alternate repre-
sentation with monotonic linear functions.
3 The complexity of Pareto optimal auctions
Our main result in this section is that – in contrast with randomized auctions – design-
ing deterministic Pareto optimal auctions under welfare and revenue objectives is an
intractable problem; in particular, we show that, even for 2 bidders 4 whose distribu-
tions are independent and regular, the problem of maximizing one criterion subject to a
lower bound on the other is (weakly) NP-hard.
Theorem 2. For two bidders with independent regular distributions, it is NP-hard to
decide whether there exists an auction with welfare at least W and revenue at least R.
Proof (Sketch). Due to space constraints, we show here the reduction for the exact
problem for the welfare objective; quite simple and intuitive, it also captures the main
idea in the (significantly more elaborate) proof for the bi-criterion problem (given in
Appendix B).
The reduction is from the Partition problem: we are given a setB = {b1, . . . , bk} of
k positive integers, and we wish to determine whether it is possible to partition B into
two subsets with equal sum. We assume that bi ≥ bi+1 for all i. Consider the rescaled
values b′i := bi/(10k · T ), where T =
∑k
i=1 bi, and the set B
′ = {b′1, . . . , b′k}. It is
clear that there exists a partition of B iff there exists a partition of B′.
We construct an instance of the auction problem with two bidders whose inde-
pendent valuations vr (row bidder) and vc (column bidder) are uniformly distributed
over supports of size k. (To avoid unnecessary clutter in the expressions, we assume
w.l.o.g – by linearity – that the “probability mass” of all elements in the support is
equal to 1, as opposed to 1/k.) The valuation distribution for the row bidder is sup-
ported on the set {1, 2, . . . , k}, while the column bidder’s valuation comes from the set
{1+ b′1, 2+ b′2, . . . , k+ b′k}. Since b′i ≥ b′i+1 and
∑k
i=1 b
′
i = 1/(10k), it is straightfor-
ward to verify that both distributions are indeed regular (see Appendix B.1).
The main idea of the proof is this: appropriately isolate a subset of 2k feasible
mechanisms whose welfare values encode the sum of values
∑
i∈S b
′
i for all possible
subsets S ⊆ [k]. The existence of a mechanism with a specified welfare value would
then reveal the existence of a partition. Formally, we prove that there exists a Partition
of B′ iff there exists a feasible mechanism M∗ with (expected) welfare
SW(M∗) = (2/3) · (k− 1)k(k+1)+ (1/2) · k(k+1)+
k∑
i=2
(i− 1)b′i+1/(20k) (1)
Consider the allocation matrix of a feasible mechanism. Recall that a mechanism is
feasible iff its allocation matrix satisfies the monotonicity constraint. The main claim
is that all mechanisms that could potentially satisfy (1) must allocate the item to the
highest bidder, except potentially for the outcomes (vr = i, vc = i + b′i) (i.e. the ones
corresponding to entries on the secondary diagonal of the matrix) when the item can be
4 Note that for a single bidder, one can enumerate all feasible mechanisms in linear time.
allocated to either bidder. Denote by R the aforementioned subclass of mechanisms.
The above claim follows from the next lemma, which shows that mechanisms in R
maximize welfare (see Appendix B.2 for the proof):
Lemma 1. We have maxM/∈R SW(M) < minM∈R SW(M) < SW(M∗).
To complete the proof, observe that all 2k mechanisms inR satisfy monotonicity, hence
are feasible. Also note that there is a natural bijection between subsets S ⊆ [k] and these
mechanisms: we include i in S iff on input (vr = i, vc = i + b′i) the item is allocated
to the column bidder. Denote by M(S) the mechanism inR corresponding to subset S
under this mapping; we will compute the welfare of M(S). Note that the contribution
of each entry of the allocation matrix (input) to the welfare equals the valuation of the
bidder who gets the item for that input. By the definition ofR, for the entries above the
secondary diagonal, the row bidder gets the item (since her valuation is strictly larger
than that of the column bidder – this is evident sincemaxi b′i < 1/(10k)). Therefore, the
contribution of these entries to the welfare equals
∑k
i=2 i(i−1) = (1/3)(k−1)k(k+1).
Similarly, for the entries below the diagonal, the column bidder gets the item and their
contribution to the welfare is
∑k
i=2(i+ b
′
i)(i−1) = (1/3)(k−1)k(k+1)+
∑k
i=2(i−
1)b′i. Finally, for the diagonal entries, if S ⊆ [k] is the subset of indices for which the
column bidder gets the item, the welfare contribution is
∑
i∈S(i+ b
′
i) +
∑
i∈[k]\S i =
k(k + 1)/2 +
∑
i∈S b
′
i. Hence, we have:
SW(M(S)) = (2/3) · (k− 1)k(k+1)+ (1/2) · k(k+1)+
k∑
i=2
(i− 1)b′i+
∑
i∈S
b′i (2)
Recalling that
∑k
i=1 b
′
i = 1/(10k), (1) and (2) imply that there exists a partition of
B′ iff there exists a feasible mechanism satisfying (1). This completes the proof sketch.
(See Appendix B.3 for the much more elaborate proof of the general case.) uunionsq
We can also prove that the size of the Pareto curve can be exponentially large (in
other words, the problem of computing the entire curve is exponential even if P =
NP ). The construction is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. There exists a family of two-bidder instances for which the size of the
Pareto curve for BI-CRITERION AUCTION grows exponentially.
4 An FPTAS for 2 bidders
In this section we give our main algorithmic result:
Theorem 4. For two bidders, there is an FPTAS to approximate the Pareto curve of the
BI-CRITERION AUCTION problem, even for arbitrarily correlated distributions.
In the proof, we design a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the exact version of the
problem (for both the welfare and revenue objectives) and then appeal to Theorem 1.
There is a difficulty, however, in showing that the problem satisfies the assumptions
of Theorem 1, because in the most natural linear representation of the problem, the
coefficients for revenue, coinciding with the virtual valuations, may be negative, thus
violating the hypothesis of Theorem 1.
We use the following alternate representation: Instead of considering the contribu-
tion of each entry (bid tuple) of the allocation matrix separately, we consider the rev-
enue and welfare resulting from all the single-bidder mechanisms (pricings) obtained
by fixing the valuation of the other bidder.
Definition 1. Let ri1,i21 andw
i1,i2
1 be the (contribution to the) revenue and welfare from
bidder 1 of the pricing which offers bidder 1 a price of vi11 when bidder 2’s value is v
i2
2 :
ri1,i21 =
∑
j≥i1 v
i1
1 · f(j, i2) and wi1,i21 =
∑
j≥i1 v
j
1 · f(j, i2), where f(·, ·) is the
joint (possibly non-product) valuation distribution. (The quantities ri1,i22 and w
i1,i2
2 are
defined analogously.)
Lemma 2. The BI-CRITERION AUCTION problem can be expressed in a way that sat-
isfies the conditions of Theorem 1.
Proof. We consider variables xij , yij , i ∈ [h1], j ∈ [h2]. The xij’s are defined as
follows: xij = 1 iff A[i, j] = 1 and A[i′, j] 6= 1 for all i′ < i. I.e. xij = 1 iff the
(i, j)-th entry of A is allocated to bidder 1 and, for this fixed value of j, i is the smallest
index for which bidder 1 gets allocated; symmetrically, yij = 1 iff A[i, j] = 2 and
A[i, j′] 6= 2 for all j′ < j. It is easy to see that the feasibility constraints are linear in
these variables. We can also express the objectives as linear functions with non-negative
coefficients as follows:
Rev(x, y) =
h1∑
i=1
h2∑
j=1
xijr
i,j
1 +
h1∑
i=1
h2∑
j=1
yijr
i,j
2
SW(x, y) =
h1∑
i=1
h2∑
j=1
xijw
i,j
1 +
h1∑
i=1
h2∑
j=1
yijw
i,j
2
uunionsq
4.1 An algorithm for the exact version of BI-CRITERION AUCTION
The main idea behind our algorithm, inspired by the characterization of Lemma 2, is
to consider the contribution from each bidder (fixing the value of the other) indepen-
dently, by going over all (linearly many) single-bidder mechanisms for both bidders.
The challenging part is to combine the individual single-bidder mechanisms into a sin-
gle two-bidder mechanism and to this end we employ dynamic programming:
Assume that both bidders have valuations of support size h; the subproblems we
consider in our dynamic program correspond to settings where we condition that the
valuation of each bidder is drawn from an upwards closed subset of his original support.
Formally, let M [i, j,W ] be True iff there exists an auction that uses the valuations
(vi1, . . . , v
h
1 ) and (v
j
2, . . . , v
h
2 ) and has welfare exactly W . In what follows Ni,j is the
normalization factor for valuations (jointly) drawn from (vi1, . . . , v
h
1 ) and (v
j
2, . . . , v
h
2 ),
namely Ni,j =
∑
k≥i,l≥j f(v
k
1 , v
l
2).
Lemma 3. We can update the quantity M [i, j,W ] as follows:
M [i, j,W ] =
∨
k≥j
M [i+ 1, j,
(
W ·Ni,j − wi,k2
)
·N−1i+1,j ]
∨
∨
k≥i
M [i, j + 1,
(
W ·Ni,j − wk,j1
)
·N−1i,j+1]
∨
∨
k>i
l>j
M [i+ 1, j + 1,
(
W ·Ni,j − wk,j1 − wi,l2
)
·N−1i+1,j+1]
Proof. LetA[i . . . h, j . . . h] be the allocation matrix of the auction that results from the
above update rule, fixing i and j. We start by noting that any allocation matrix A can
have one of the following four forms:
F1: There exist i′ and j′ such that A[i, j′] = 1 and A[i′, j] = 2.
F2: There exists i′ such that A[i′, j] = 2 but there is no j′ such that A[i, j′] = 1.
F3: There exists j′ such that A[i, j′] = 1 but there is no i′ such that A[i′, j] = 2.
F4: There exist no i′ and j′ such that A[i, j′] = 1 or A[i′, j] = 2.
Because of monotonicity it follows immediately that no allocation matrix of form F1
can be valid, and the other three forms correspond to the three terms of the recurrence;
finally note that for any such form, say F2, the first term of the update rule forM [i, j,W ]
runs over all possible pricings for bidder 1 (keeping the value of bidder 2 at vj2) and
checks whether they induce the required welfare. uunionsq
We omit the straightforwards details of how the above recurrence can be efficiently
implemented as a pseudo-polynomial dynamic programming algorithm. The algorithm
for deciding whether there exists an auction with revenue exactly R is identical to the
above by simply replacing R (the revenue target value) for W and ri1,i2j for w
i1,i2
j .
5 The case of n bidders
When the number n of bidders is part of the input, the allocation matrix is no longer a
polynomially succinct representation of a mechanism. In fact, it is by no means clear
whether BI-CRITERION AUCTION is even in NP in this case: we next show that for
the case of n binary bidders, the problem is NP -hard and in PSPACE:
Theorem 5. For n binary-valued bidders BI-CRITERION AUCTION is (weakly) NP-
hard and in PSPACE.
Proof (Sketch). For simplicity, we prove both results for the exact version of the prob-
lem for welfare; the bi-objective case follows by a straightforward but tedious general-
ization.
The NP-hardness reduction is from Partition. Let B = {b1, . . . , bk} be a set of pos-
itive rationals; we can assume by rescaling that
∑k
i=1 bi = 1/100. We construct an
instance of the auction problem as follows: there are k bidders, with uniform distri-
butions (again we will assume unit masses for simplicity) over the following supports
{li, hi}, i = 1 . . . n, where li < hi. We set li = bi and demand that {hi}i=1,...,n
forms a super-increasing sequence (i.e. hi+1 >
∑i
j=1 hj), with h1 > maxi bi. The
claim is that there exists a partition of B iff there exists an auction with welfare equal
to
∑k
i=1 hi + (1/2)
∑k
i=1 bi. To see this notice that – since the sequence {hi}i=1...n
is super-increasing – any mechanism with the above welfare value must must allocate
to bidder i for exactly one valuation tuple (vi, v−i) where vi = hi; the corresponding
contribution to the welfare from this case is hi. Monotonicity then implies that this auc-
tion can allocate to bidder i for at most one valuation tuple (vi, v−i) where vi = li;
the corresponding contribution to the welfare from this case is bi. We therefore get a
bijection between subsets of B and mechanisms, by including an element bi in the set
S iff bidder i gets allocated the item for some valuation tuple (vi, v−i) where vi = li,
and the claim follows.
For the PSPACE upper bound, we start by noting that the problem of computing
an auction with welfare (or revenue) exactly W , can be formulated as the problem of
computing a matching of weight exactly W in a particular type of bipartite graphs
(first pointed out in [12], see Appendix D) with a number of nodes that is exponential
in the number of bidders. The EXACT MATCHING problem is known to be solvable
in RNC [21]; since our input provides an exponentially succinct representation of the
constructed graph, we are interested in the so-called succinct version of the problem [15,
27]. By standard techniques, the succinct version of EXACT MATCHING in our setting
is solvable in PSPACE, and the theorem follows. uunionsq
We conjecture the above upper bound to be tight (i.e. the problem is actually PSPACE-
complete) even for n bidders with arbitrary supports.
6 Open Questions
Is there is an FPTAS for 3 bidders? We conjecture that there is, and in fact for any
constant number of bidders. Of course, the approach of our FPTAS for 2 bidders cannot
be generalized, since it works for the correlated case, which is APX-complete for 3
or more bidders. We have derived two different dynamic programming-based PTAS’s
for the uncorrelated problem, but so far, despite a hopeful outlook, we have failed to
generalize them to 3 bidders. Finally, we conjecture that for n bidders the problem is
significantly harder, namely PSPACE-complete and inapproximable.
On a different note, it would be interesting to see if we can get better approximations
for some special types of distributions; we give one such type of result in Appendix A.
Are there improved approximation guarantees for more general kinds of distributions
and n bidders?
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Appendix
We provide here proofs that did not appear in the main body, due to space limitations.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of f . We say a distribution satisfies
the monotone hazard rate condition iff the ratio 1−F (t)f(t) is non-increasing; notice in par-
ticular that any binary-valued distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition.
We start with a simple example with 2 bidders for which the Pareto curve is not
convex, while the bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from two non-identical
distributions of support 2; this is presented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: The objective space of all two-player auctions when (v11 , v21) = (11, 20), (v12 , v22) =
(2, 5) and (f1i , f
2
i ) = (1/3, 2/3) for i = 1, 2.
On the positive side we show that the Pareto curve is convex for a single bidder
with valuation drawn from a monotone hazard rate distribution. Since in the discrete
case one can simply enumerate the set of all feasible auctions in linear time anyway,
this result is of interest only in the continuous case.
Let M(r) be the single-player mechanism (pricing) that makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer of r to the player; notice that in this case the Pareto curve is a mono-parametric
curve on the plane where x = SW[M(r)] and y = Rev[M(r)]. We next show that
this monoparametric curve is in fact convex; the following is a necessary and sufficient
condition for (local) convexity of mono-parametric (continuous) curves:
∣∣∣∣x′(r) x′′(r)y′(r) y′′(r)
∣∣∣∣ = x′(r)y′′(r)− y′(r)x′′(r) ≥ 0
Substituting x = SW[M(r)] =
∫ 1
r
vf(v) dv and y = Rev[M(r)] = r
∫ 1
r
f(v) dv
and doing the algebra we get the following necessary and sufficient condition:
r(f(r))2 +
∫ 1
r
f(v) dv · [f(r) + rf ′(r)] ≥ 0 (3)
By definition, for monotone hazard rate distributions the ratio 1−F (r)f(r) is a non-increasing
function of r; taking derivatives5 we get that for these distributions it must hold that:
(1− F (r))f ′(r) + (f(r))2 ≥ 0 (4)
By substituting f ′(r) from (4) into the LHS of (3) we get that it is indeed ≥ 0.
An interesting open question is whether the property of convex Pareto curves ex-
tends to 2 or more bidders with valuations distributed identically according to some
monotone hazard rate distribution.
B Omitted Proofs from Theorem 2
B.1 Proof of Regularity
We define the virtual valuation of a bidder with valuation vi, taking values from {v1i , . . . , vki }
with probabilities {f1i , . . . , fki }, as follows:
φji = v
j
i − (vj+1i − vji )
f j+1i + . . .+ f
k
i
f ji
Substituting for the setting in hand, we get that the virtual valuation of the row player
is φjr = 2j − k, while the virtual valuation of the column player is:
φjc = j + b
′
j − (b′j+1 − b′j + 1)(k − j)
A distribution is called regular iff φji ≤ φj+1i ; it follows immediately that the row
player’s distribution is regular, while for the second player we need that
j + 1 + b′j+1 − (b′j+2 − b′j+1 + 1)(k − j − 1) ≥ j + b′j − (b′j+1 − b′j + 1)(k − j)
and since b′j+1 ≥ b′j+2 it suffices that
j + 1 + b′j+1 − (k − j − 1) ≥ j + b′j − (b′j+1 − b′j + 1)(k − j)
Rearranging terms and doing some calculations we get that it suffices to have b′j+1 ≥
b′j − 2/k, which follows from the fact that
∑k
i=1 b
′
i = 1/(10k).
5 We make the analytically convenient assumption that f is differentiable here.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that this lemma implies that only mechanisms inR can potentially satisfy (1). To
prove it we proceed as follows: Consider a partition of the allocation matrixA into three
subsets: (i) the subset of the matrix above the secondary diagonal, (ii) the subset below
the diagonal and (iii) the diagonal itself. The gist of the proof is this: The contribution
to the welfare for subsets (i) and (ii) is maximized for mechanisms in R. The welfare
contribution from (i) and (ii) for any other mechanism (i.e. not in R) is strictly smaller
by a quantity sufficiently large that outweighs any effects on the welfare from subset
(iii).
Let us first compute minM∈R SW(M), the minimum welfare of a mechanism in
R. It is easy to see that the welfare minimizing mechanism is the one that assigns the
item to the row player for all entries in the diagonal. That is, it corresponds to S = ∅ in
the bijection defined in the body of the proof, hence we have
min
M∈R
SW(M) = (2/3) · (k − 1)k(k + 1) + (1/2) · k(k + 1) +
k∑
i=2
(i− 1)b′i.
So, we obtain the second inequality of the lemma. To bound from abovemaxM 6∈R SW(M)
we consider three cases: Consider first the subset of the allocation matrix above the di-
agonal. If any entry of this subset is allocated to the column player, then it is not hard to
see that this would lower the welfare value by at least 1−maxi b′i ≥ 1−1/(10k) ≥ 0.9.
Similarly, if any entry is not allocated al all (i.e. the auctioneer keeps the item), this
would cost us at least 1. For the subset below the diagonal the situation is analogous;
if an entry is allocated to the row player, this costs us at least 1, same if an entry is
not allocated at all. This decrease in the value of the welfare cannot be compensated by
the diagonal entries; indeed, if all such entries are allocated to either player, contribu-
tion to the welfare lies in [k(k + 1)/2, k(k + 1)/2 + 1/(10k)] (an interval of length
1/(10k) ≤ 1/10.) As a consequence, any mechanism that disagrees with R either be-
low or above the diagonal has welfare strictly smaller than minM∈R SW(M). Now
consider a mechanism that agrees with R except potentially at the diagonal. Note that
a non-allocated entry of the diagonal costs at least 1, and again this cannot be com-
pensated by the 1/10 potential contribution of the column player. This completes the
proof.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The high-level idea is similar as the proof presented in the body of the paper (for the
exact version of the welfare objective) but the details are more elaborate. At a high-
level, the difficulty is that the two objective functions (welfare, revenue) depend on each
other in a subtle way. Thus, a more complicated construction is required to “decouple”
these two criteria. (It is not hard to see that the construction presented for the exact
version fails for the bi-objective problem.) Very roughly, the reduction ends up using
non-uniform distributions on larger and carefully selected supports.
As before, our reduction is from Partition. We start with a set A = {a1, . . . , ak}
of positive numbers (rescaled so that they sum to a sufficiently small positive constant)
and we want to decide whether there exists a partition of this set. We will construct
an instance of the auction problem with 2 players and distributions of support size
2k + 1. Before presenting the actual instance we first give some intuition behind the
construction.
Similarly, our goal is to establish a bijection between an appropriate subset of feasi-
ble mechanisms and subsets S of [k]; since the number of feasible mechanisms greatly
exceeds that of subsets ofA, we have to limit our attention to a subset of feasible mech-
anisms. To that end, we are going to appropriately pick the target values for welfare and
revenue, so that the only relevant auctions in our reduction will be those that allocate
the item to player 2 (column player) for entries above the diagonal (i.e. (vi1, v
j
2) with
j > i) and to player 1 (row player) for entries below the diagonal (i.e. (vi1, v
j
2) with
j < i). We will also exclude the possibility of not allocating the item across the diag-
onal entries of the allocation matrix, so that the only relevant auctions are the 22k+1
different auctions that allocate to either player 1 or 2 across the diagonal, all of which
respect monotonicity and are therefore feasible. Call this subset of mechanisms R. We
will then use the i-th odd entry of the diagonal to encode the decision of including or
not the i-the element of A in the set S: we shall include element i iff player 1 gets
allocated for entry (2i− 1, 2i− 1) of the allocation matrix.
The first step is therefore to ensure that the only relevant mechanisms are the ones
with the above property. To this end we ask that the following relation between the
players’ valuations holds:
vi1 < v
i
2 < v
i+1
1 < v
i+1
2 < v
i+2
1 , for i = 1 . . . 2k − 1 (5)
Relation (5) implies that the social welfare from the entries on top and below the diag-
onal is maximized by a mechanism that allocates to player 2 on top of the diagonal and
to player 1 below the diagonal; therefore by setting a sufficiently high welfare target W
in our reduction we will be able to guarantee that the only relevant auctions will have
this format.
More specifically, the distributions are defined as follows (where  > 0 a sufficiently
small parameter):
The (unnormalized) probabilities of the two players are:
f ij =
{
1 if i is odd;
 if i is even.
for both players j = 1, 2, where  is some small constant to be determined later. (The
point of the small probability elements, is to achieve the desired decoupling between
welfare and revenue; it may be convenient for the reader to think of  as if it was 0. In
the course of the proof, we will provide a sufficient upper bound on its magnitude.)
The values of player 1 are:
vi1 =

i+ a i+1
2
for i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , 2k − 1};
i+ a i
2
(
1 + 4(2k−i+2)(1+)
)
for i ∈ {2, 4, . . . , 2k};
2k + 1 for i = 2k + 1.
The values of player 2 are:
vi2 =
 i for i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , 2k − 1};i for i ∈ {2, 4, . . . , 2k};
2k + 1 for i = 2k + 1.
We note that there are 3 different scales of numbers in the reduction. The values of
the elements in the support (big scale), the magnitudes of the elements of A (medium
scale), and the magnitude of  (small scale).
Recall we would like to make the sum of welfare and revenue remain constant
across all mechanisms in R; by doing so we can ensure that whenever a mechanism
achieves the target welfare and revenue values, the relations will in fact hold with
equality, allowing us to encode an instance of Partition. To achieve that, we impose
an even stronger requirement: In particular, consider the following entries of the alloca-
tion matrix: (vi1, v
j
2), j = i . . . 2k + 1 and (v
j
1, v
i
2), j = i . . . 2k + 1, where i is an odd
number. Assuming our auction has the format discussed above, entries (vi1, v
j
2), j =
i + 1 . . . 2k + 1 are allocated to player 2, entries (vj1, v
i
2), j = i + 1 . . . 2k + 1 are
allocated to player 1, and we are left to decide which player to allocate entry (vi1, v
i
2)
to. Now let SWij (resp. Rev
i
j), where i is odd and j ∈ {1, 2}, denote the welfare (resp.
revenue) that results from the aforementioned entries if we allocate entry (vi1, v
i
2) to
player j. The stronger requirement that we impose is that SWi1+Rev
i
1 = SW
i
2+Rev
i
2
for all odd i. To see what this entails we next write the expressions for SWij and Rev
i
j :
SWi1 = v
i
1 +
k∑
j= i+12
v2j+11 +
k∑
j= i+12
v2j+12 +  ·
 k∑
j= i+12
v2j1 +
k∑
j= i+12
v2j2

Revi1 = v
i
1
(
2k − i+ 1
2
(1 + ) + 1
)
+ vi+12
(
2k − i− 1
2
+
2k − i+ 1
2
+ 1
)
SWi2 =
k∑
j= i+12
v2j+11 + v
i
2 +
k∑
j= i+12
v2j+12 +  ·
 k∑
j= i+12
v2j1 +
k∑
j= i+12
v2j2

Revi2 = v
i+1
1
(
2k − i− 1
2
+
2k − i+ 1
2
+ 1
)
+ vi2
(
2k − i+ 1
2
(1 + ) + 1
)
Notice that SWi1 − SWi2 = vi1 − vi2. In order to have SWi1 +Revi1 = SWi2 +Revi2 we
ask that:
Revi1 − Revi2 = vi2 − vi1 (6)
The only difficulty in satisfying the relation above, is that equation (6) necessarily
imposes some additional constraints on the values vi+11 , v
i+1
2 ; we get around this by
using a support of roughly twice the size of A, and using only half of the points in the
support to encode the elements of A; the remaining points are assigned a very small
probability, so that they have a negligible effect on the overall welfare and revenue. It
is now easy to verify that the aforementioned choice of distributions for the two players
satisfies properties (5) (since ai are assumed to be sufficiently small) and (6) above.
For the aforementioned choice of values vij the social welfare contributions now
become:
SWi1 = v
i
1 +Xi = i+ a i+1
2
+Xi and SWi2 = v
i
2 +Xi = i+Xi
for some Xi whose exact value is irrelevant (and can be derived from the expressions
above); analogously for revenue we have:
Revi1 = v
i
2 + Yi = i+ Yi and Rev
i
2 = v
i
1 + Yi = i+ a i+1
2
+ Yi
for some Yi. We therefore have SWi1 +Rev
i
1 = SW
i
2 +Rev
i
2 = 2i+Xi + Yi + a i+1
2
and we have thus ensured that all mechanisms with the property of allocating to player
2 on top of the diagonal and to player 1 below the diagonal have a sum of (total) revenue
and welfare that can be upper-bounded as follows:
SW +Rev ≤
∑
odd i
(2i+Xi + Yi + a i+1
2
) + v2k+11 + v
2k+1
2 +  · 2n2(2k + 1)
where the last term is an upper bound on the contribution in revenue and welfare of the
even rows and columns (where we took into account that the maximum contribution of
any entry is at most the maximum value appearing in the support of any player, namely
2k + 1). We next fix the value of  so that the quantity
 · 2n2(2k + 1)
is smaller than the accuracy used in the rational numbers ai. Note that this can always
be done with an  that has polynomially many bits – since the ai’s are by assumption
rational numbers with polynomially many bits.
We are now ready to argue that there exists a partition ofA iff there exists an auction
with:
SW ≥
∑
odd i
(i+Xi)+2k+1+
1
2
k∑
i=1
ai and Rev ≥
∑
odd i
(i+Yi)+2k+1+
1
2
k∑
i=1
ai
(7)
Given any partition S of A, we can turn it into a mechanism with the above welfare
and revenue guarantees by allocating to player 2 on top of the diagonal, player 1 below
the diagonal and allocating to player 1 for entries (2i− 1, 2i− 1), i = 1 . . . k, for all i
s.t. ai ∈ S; the even entries on the diagonal, as well as the entry (2k + 1, 2k + 1) can
be allocated to either player.
Conversely, given a mechanism with welfare and revenue as above we can get a
partition of A. To see how, first notice that because of property (5) above (and because
ai are much smaller) the only mechanisms that can achieve a social welfare of at least∑
odd i i + Xi and revenue of at least
∑
odd i i + Yi are those that allocate to player 2
above the diagonal, player 1 below the diagonal, and always allocate to either player
1 or player 2 on the diagonal. In the discussion above we established that for those
mechanisms it holds that:
SW+Rev ≤
(∑
odd i
(i+Xi) + 2k + 1 +
1
2
k∑
i=1
ai
)
+
(∑
odd i
(i+ Yi) + 2k + 1 +
1
2
k∑
i=1
ai
)
+·2n2(2k+1)
(8)
By our choice of  and inequalities (7) and (8) it follows that the inequalities in (7) must
hold with equality; we then get a partition by including in S all elements i for which
(2i− 1, 2i− 1) is allocated to player 1. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 3
The construction is similar to the reduction for the exact problem in Theorem 2. We will
construct a 2 player auction and we will argue that there exists an appropriate subset of
the Pareto curve with exponential size.
We describe an instance with 2 players, both with uniform distributions over the fol-
lowing supports of size k: Player 1 has values in {1+a1, 2+a2, . . . , k+ak}, and player
2 has values in {1, 2, . . . , k}, with all ai << 1; the exact value of ai will be determined
later. Assume player 1 is on the horizontal axis of the two-player allocation matrix and
consider a mechanism that allocates the item to player 2 for all entries above the diago-
nal (i.e. (vi1, v
j
2) with j > i), to player 1 for all entries below the diagonal (i.e. (v
i
1, v
j
2)
with j < i), and to either player on the diagonal (see Table 1); such a mechanism can
be concisely described through the diagonal entries of its allocation matrix. In what
follows we write SW(A[v11 , v
1
2 ], . . . , A[v
k
1 , v
k
2 ]) and Rev(A[v
1
1 , v
1
2 ], . . . , A[v
k
1 , v
k
2 ]) to
denote the welfare and revenue respectively of this mechanism. We note that this subset
of feasible mechanisms maximizes the welfare over all feasible mechanisms; hence, it
suffices to show that the Pareto set of this subset is exponential. In fact, we will choose
the ai’s appropriately so that all these mechanisms are undominated.
Our goal is to pick values a1, . . . , ak such that all 2k different mechanisms of the
above type will be Pareto optimal. To do that we observe that under some mild condi-
tions on the ai, satisfied by picking for example ai = 3i−1 (and normalizing so that the
normalized sum is small e.g. < 1/1000), we can impose orderings on the welfares and
revenues of those 2k mechanisms that go in opposite directions, i.e. one mechanism has
larger revenue than another iff it has smaller welfare. To this end we make the follow-
ing two claims, which can be verified by explicitly writing down the expressions for
revenue and welfare and doing some elementary calculations:
Claim 1: If ai > 0 and ai < n−in−i+1ai+1 for all i, it holds that:
1. SW(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, 1, ξi+1, . . . , ξk) > SW(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, 2, ξi+1, . . . , ξk)
2. Rev(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, 1, ξi+1, . . . , ξk) < Rev(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, 2, ξi+1, . . . , ξk)
for any ξi ∈ {1, 2}.
Claim 2: If
∑i−1
j=1 aj < ai and ai <
n−i
2(n−i+1)ai+1 for all i, it holds that:
1. SW(1, . . . , 1, 2, ξi+1, . . . , ξk) < SW(2, . . . , 2, 1, ψi+1, . . . , ψk)
2. Rev(1, . . . , 1, 2, ξi+1, . . . , ξk) > Rev(2, . . . , 2, 1, ψi+1, . . . , ψk)
for any ξi, ψi ∈ {1, 2}; note that in general we may have ψi 6= ξi.
Intuitively Claim 1 says that switching any 1 into a 2 on any entry of the diagonal
has the effect of decreasing the welfare while increasing the revenue; Claim 2 on the
other hand says that the (negative) effect that a 2 on the diagonal has on the welfare, is
bigger for 2’s that are placed in higher positions –and in analogy for revenue.
Using the above two claims one can now prove that for any two mechanisms M1 =
(ξ1, . . . , ξk) andM2 = (ψ1, . . . , ψk), it holds that SW(M1) > SW(M2) iffRev(M1) <
Rev(M2), and therefore all the 2k mechanisms are Pareto optimal. We convey the
idea by means of the following example, for k = 5; consider the two mechanisms
M1 = (1, 2, 1, 1, 1) and M2 = (1, 1, 2, 2, 1). We then have:
SW(M1) = SW(1, 2, 1, 1, 1) > SW(2, 2, 2, 1, 1) > SW(1, 1, 1, 2, 1) > SW(1, 1, 2, 2, 1) = SW(M2)
with the inequalities above following from Claim 1.1, 2.1 and 1.1 respectively; in com-
plete analogy we can show that Rev(M1) < Rev(M2).
vk2 = k 2 2 2 . . . 1 or 2
vk−12 = k − 1 2 2 . . . 1 or 2 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
v22 = 2 2 1 or 2 . . . 1 1
v12 = 1 1 or 2 1 . . . 1 1
v11 = 1 + a1 v
2
1 = 2 + a2 . . . v
k−1
1 = k − 1 + ak−1 vk1 = k + ak
Table 1: An instance with an exponential size Pareto set
D Omitted Details from Theorem 5
The graph is the following: We assume that each bidder has two values {v1i , v2i }, with
v2i > v
1
i , and for each of the 2
n valuation tuples we create a node in the graph labeled
by this tuple (vi)i. We connect two such nodes if their labels differ in exactly one
coordinate, say the i-th one; the weight of this edge is
∏
j 6=i f
kj
j · (f1i v1i + f2i v2i ) for
welfare and
∏
j 6=i f
kj
j · v1i (f1i + f2i ) for revenue. We also introduce a set of dummy
nodes: for every node with label (vi)i, where |{i|vi = v2i }| = k, we introduce k dummy
nodes and associate each one of them with the bidder i for whom vi = v2i . We then add
an edge between this node and all its dummy nodes; the weight of the edge connecting
to the dummy node of the i-th player is
∏
j 6=i f
kj
j · f2i v2i both for welfare and revenue.
It is easy to verify that every matching in the above graph corresponds to a deter-
ministic truthful mechanism as follows: for each bid vector, consider the corresponding
node in the graph. If it is not matched to any other node, then allocate nothing; if it is
matched to a dummy node, then allocate the item to the bidder that is associated with
this dummy node; otherwise, it is matched to another non-dummy node and these two
nodes differ in exactly one coordinate, say the i-th, in which case we allocate to the i-th
bidder. It is easy to check that the resulting mechanism is both feasible and monotone
(IC and IR). Moreover, the welfare (or revenue depending on the kind of weights used)
is equal to the weight of the matching.
